Minimax Theorem for Latent Games or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying
  about Mixed-Nash and Love Neural Nets by Gidel, Gauthier et al.
Minimax Theorem for Latent Games or:
How I Learned to Stop Worrying about Mixed-Nash and Love Neural Nets
Gauthier Gidel 1 2 David Balduzzi 1 Wojciech Marian Czarnecki 1 Marta Garnelo 1 Yoram Bachrach 1
Abstract
Adversarial training, a special case of multi-
objective optimization, is an increasingly useful
tool in machine learning. For example, two-player
zero-sum games are important for generative mod-
eling (GANs) and for mastering games like Go
or Poker via self-play. A classic result in Game
Theory states that one must mix strategies, as pure
equilibria may not exist. Surprisingly, machine
learning practitioners typically train a single pair
of agents – instead of a pair of mixtures – going
against Nash’s principle. Our main contribution
is a notion of limited-capacity-equilibrium for
which, as capacity grows, optimal agents – not
mixtures – can learn increasingly expressive and
realistic behaviors. We define latent games, a new
class of game where agents are mappings that
transform latent distributions. Examples include
generators in GANs, which transform Gaussian
noise into distributions on images, and StarCraft
II agents, which transform sampled build orders
into policies. We show that minimax equilibria
in latent games can be approximated by a single
pair of dense neural networks. Finally, we apply
our latent game approach to solve differentiable
Blotto, a game with an infinite strategy space.
“As far as I can see, there could be no theory of games
[without] the Minimax Theorem”– von Neumann (1953)
1. Introduction
Externally defined games have been used as benchmarks in
artificial intelligence for decades (Samuel, 1959; Tesauro,
1995), with recent progress on increasingly complex do-
mains such as poker (Brown and Sandholm, 2017; 2019),
chess, Go (Silver et al., 2017), and StarCraft II (Vinyals
et al., 2019). At the same time, remarkable progress in gen-
erative modeling of images (Wu et al., 2019) and speech
*Equal contribution 1DeepMind 2PhD student at DIRO and
Mila, Universite´ de Montre´al. Correspondence to: Gauthier Gidel
<firstname.lastname@umontreal.ca>.
synthesis (Bin´kowski et al., 2020) has resulted from zero-
sum games designed specifically to facilitate via carefully
constructed arms races (Goodfellow et al., 2014). Zero-sum
games also play a fundamental role in building classifiers
that are robust to adversarial attacks (Madry et al., 2017).
The goal of the paper is to put learning – by neural nets – in
two-player zero-sum games on a firm theoretical foundation
to answer the question: What does it mean to solve a game?
In single agent learning, performance is well-defined via
a fixed objective. However, it is not obvious what counts
as optimal in a two-player zero-sum setting. Since each
player’s goal is to maximize its payoff, it is natural to ask
whether a player can maximize its utility independently of
how the other player behaves. von Neumann et al. (1944)
laid the foundation of game theory with the Minimax theo-
rem, which provides a meaningful notion of optimal behav-
ior against an unknown adversary.
In short, a meaningful solution for a two-player zero-sum
game must incorporate two notions: (i) a number V, called
the value of the game, (ii) a strategy for each player such
that their average gain is at least V (resp. -V) no matter what
the other does. The optimal course of action is typically to
choose a mixed strategy (a distribution over pure strategies).
The existence of a value and optimal strategies is guaranteed
by the Minimax theorem (von Neumann et al., 1944).
From a game theoretic perspective it is obvious that pure-
equilibria need not exist and so we should work with mixed
strategies. Nevertheless, machine learning practitioners typ-
ically train a single pair of agents (instead of a pair of mix-
tures), where each of them is represented by a neural net.
In this work, we reconcile machine learning (ML) prac-
tice with game theory. We make four main contributions.
(i) We formulate latent games, a new class of games, with
many application in machine learning, where the agents
leverage function approximation to directly encode mixed
strategies. (ii) We prove the existence of a new notion of
limited-capacity-equilibrium in latent games that differs
from the standard Nash equilibrium of the game. (iii) We
show that in some cases, e.g. GANs, the first player can
exploit the concavity of its payoff to only play pure strate-
gies. We call such games semi-latent games and extend our
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results on latent games to semi-latent games. (iv) Finally,
we show that, for agents parametrized by ReLU neural net-
works, such a limited-capacity-equilibrium can be achieved
by a pair of pure-agents.
To sum-up, our main contribution is the proof of the ex-
istence of an approximate global minimax achieved by a
single pair of ReLU neural networks for a large class of
two player games that includes GANs. This result contrasts
with the negative result of Jin et al. (2019) who construct a
nonconvex-nonconcave game where pure global minimax
does not exist.
1.1. Related work
Minimax theorems in GANs. The notion of a mixed
Nash equilibrium for GANs was already originally men-
tioned by Goodfellow et al. (2014) but without taking into
account the limited capacity of the models. Many papers
have adopted a game theoretic perspective to understand
GANs and motivate the computation of mixed equilib-
ria (Arora et al., 2017; Oliehoek et al., 2018; Hsieh et al.,
2019; Grnarova et al., 2018). However, these papers fail
to explain why, in practice, it suffices to train only a single
generator and discriminator.
We argue that generators directly encode mixed strategies
using a latent structure and discriminators correspond to
pure strategies. The discriminator player is not required to
play mixed strategies because of the concavity of the payoff
function. We show that instead the discriminator player can
reach an equilibrium by playing a point-wise average of
classifiers, giving a principled motivation for the practical
method proposed by Durugkar et al. (2017).
Overall, even if our motivations are similar to the theoretical
related work mentioned above (providing principled results),
our results and conclusion are fundamentally different: we
are able to explain why using a single generator and dis-
criminator makes sense by proving that a notion of pure
minimax equilibrium is achieved for GANs parametrized
with neural networks.
Stackelberg games. Other notions of equilibrium have
been considered in the literature. Recently, Fiez et al. (2019)
and Jin et al. (2019) proved results on games where the
goal is to find a Stackelberg equilibrium. Such a notion
of equilibrium may be meaningful in some contexts such
as adversarial training but we argue in §1.2 that the mini-
max theorem is fundamental for defining a valid notion of
solution for a large class of machine learning applications.
Latent policies in Multi-agent RL. Our notion of latent
games can be related to the latent policies used in some
multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) applications. For
instance the agent trained by Vinyals et al. (2019) to play the
game of StarCraft II had policies of form pi(a|s, z) where z
belongs to structured space that corresponds to a particular
way to start the game or to actions it should complete during
the game (for instance building a particular unit or building).
The correspondence between a given structured z and spe-
cific action a to complete during the game was imposed by
a loss penalty L(pi(a|z)|z) and z was sampled according to
what was played by human players: z ∼ phuman(z).
In our work, we do not impose any semantically meaningful
structure for the latent space a-priori and do not ground the
latent space to any extra loss in the game. We instead pro-
pose a general theory to understand, study and play games
using latent mappings.
Finding a Nash of Colonel Blotto. After its introduction
by Borel (1921), finding the Nash of the Colonel Blotto
game has been an open question for 85 years. Roberson
(2006) found an equilibrium solution for the continuous ver-
sion of the game, later extended to the discrete symmetric
case by Hart (2008). The equilibrium computation in the
general case remains open. Recently, Blotto has been used
as a challenging use-case for equilibrium computation (Ah-
madinejad et al., 2019). In the same vein, we consider a
variant of Blotto to validate the efficiency of our method.
1.2. Relevance of the Minimax theorem for ML
A notorious ML application which has a minimax formu-
lation is adversarial training where a classifier is trained
to be robust against adversarial attack. From a game theo-
retic perspective, the adversarial attack is picked after the
classifier f is set and thus corresponds to a best response.
From a learning perspective, the goal is to learn to be robust
to adversarial attacks specifically designed against the cur-
rent classifier. Such an equilibrium is called a Stackelberg
Equilibrium (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006).
In games with imperfect information such as Colonel Blotto,
Poker, or StarCraft II the players must commit to a strategy
without the knowledge of the strategy picked by their oppo-
nent. In that case, the agents cannot design attacks specific
to their opponent, because such attacks may be exploitable
strategies. It is thus strictly equivalent to consider that the
players simultaneously pick their respective strategies and
then reveal them. Under these considerations a meaning-
ful notion of playing the game must have a value and an
equilibrium.
In machine learning applications, each player is trained
using local information (though gradient or RL based meth-
ods). Because the behavior of the players changes slowly,
they cannot have access to the best response against their
opponent. In order to illustrate that point, let us consider
the example of Generative Adversarial Networks. The two
agents (the generator and the discriminator) are usually se-
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quentially updated using a gradient method with similar
step-sizes. During training, one cannot expect an agent to
find a best response in a single (or few) gradient steps. To
sum-up, since local updates are performed one must expect
to reach a point that is locally stable, i.e. a local equilibrium.
1.3. Structure of the Paper
In §2, starting from the definition of a two-player zero-
sum game, we define latent games, a way to play games
using latent mappings, and show that they induce a notion
of limited-capacity equilibrium that differs from the Nash
equilibria of the original game. Then, in §3, we show that
approximate limited-capacity-equilibria can be achieved
with small mixtures. Finally, in §4, we prove that mixture
of ReLU neural networks can be expressed with a single
larger ReLU network and thus show that ReLU networks
can achieve a notion of pure -equilibrium.
All the proof of the propositions and theorems of §2,3, and 4
can be respectively found in §C,D, and E.
2. Using Latent Agents to Solve Games
Recall the definition of a two-player zero-sum game:
Definition 1. A two-player zero-sum game is given by a
payoff function that evaluate pairs of strategies
ϕ : A×B → R
Players pick strategies in A and B respectively. If the play-
ers choose a ∈ A and b ∈ B, the first player receives
reward ϕ(a, b) and the second receives −ϕ(a, b).
The goal for each player is to find a non-exploitable strategy
or Nash equilibrium: a pair (a∗, b∗) satisfying
ϕ(a, b∗) ≤ ϕ(a∗, b∗) ≤ ϕ(a∗, b) , ∀a ∈ A, b ∈ B
Any fixed action may be exploitable and so pure Nash equi-
libria need not exist. von Neumann et al. (1944) introduced
mixed strategies p ∈ P(A) where P(A) is the set of proba-
bility distributions over A, which guarantees the existence
of an equilibrium. If we consider two mixed strategies
p ∈ P(A) and q ∈ P(B), the associated payoff is:
ϕ(p, q) = Ea∼p,b∼q[ϕ(a, b)] .
For mixed strategies von Neumann et al. (1944) proved the
Minimax theorem:
V:= min
q∈P(B)
max
p∈P(A)
ϕ(p, q) = max
p∈P(A)
min
q∈P(B)
ϕ(p, q). (1)
Example 1 (Rock-Paper-Scissors). Consider the game with
three actions {r, p, s} such that
r beats s , s beats p and p beats r . (rps)
Playing a mixed strategy is playing a probability vector
p ≥ 0, s.t., pr + pp + ps = 1. The payoff of this game is
ϕ(p, q) := p>Mq where M correspond to (rps).
The Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗) of this game is simply p∗ =
q∗ , p∗r = p
∗
p = p
∗
s =
1
3 .
The Nash equilibrium of a two-player zero-sum game can be
cast as the solution to a linear program (Chvatal, 1983) and
can thus be solved in polynomial time. However, for some
games the number of strategies available may be exponential
or infinite making the Nash intractable.
Example 2 (Colonel Blotto Game). Consider two players
who control armies of S1 and S2 soldiers respectively. Each
colonel allocates their soldiers on K battlefields. A strategy
for player-i is an allocation ai ∈ Ai defined as
Ai :=
{
a ∈ NK : ∑Kk=1[a]k ≤ Si , 1 ≤ k ≤ K}. (2)
The payoff of the first player is the number of battlefields
won (because more soldiers were allocated):
ϕ(a1, a2) :=
1
K
K∑
k=1
1{[a1]k > [a2]k} .
We present experiments with Blotto in §5. For now, note
that the number of strategies grows exponentially in K.
An important example is generative adversarial net-
works (Goodfellow et al., 2014). It is usually described
as a game between a generator that create samples that aim
to look similar to ‘real’ samples and a discriminator that
classify samples as ‘real’ or ‘fake’. Thus, a naive way to
cast GANs according to Definition 1 is the following:
Example 3 (Naive GAN). The first player, the discrimina-
tor, chooses ψ ∈ F : Rd → R. The second player, the
generator, proposes an image x ∈ [0, 1]d.1 The payoff ϕ is
then the ability of the first player to discriminate a real data
distribution pdata from the generated x,
ϕ(ψ, x) := Ex′∼pdata
[
ln
(
σ(ψ(x′)
)]
+ ln
(
1− σ(ψ(x)) .
The number of strategies is infinite for both players, so the
space of mixed strategies is infinite dimensional and difficult
to work with. Remarkably, the machine learning community
has found approximate equilibria of GANs using single pairs
of networks – rather than mixtures.
Hypothesis: Example 3 suggests that GANs use function
approximation to construct mixtures of strategies.
We generalize this, showing how one can approximate the
mixed Nash using generative functions in any game.
1We decided to consider logits prediction for the discriminator
because doing so the function ϕ(·, x) is 1-Lipschitz
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Algorithm 1 Latent Game Meta-algorithm
Input: Payoff ϕ, sets F and G, and batch size B.
repeat
Sample z1, . . . , zB ∼ pi and z′1, . . . , z′B ∼ pi′
ϕ˜←∑Bi,j=1 ϕ(f(zi), g(zj)) (Compute the payoff)
f ← oracle(f,F , ϕ˜) (Improve the 1st player)
g ← oracle(g,G,−ϕ˜) (Improve the 2nd player)
until An approximate equilibrium is reached
2.1. Latent Games
The games arising in machine learning are not classical
normal- or extensive-form games. Rather, they often use
neural nets to approximate complex functions and high di-
mensional distributions (Brock et al., 2019). Motivated by
Examples 2 and 3, we propose to use function approxima-
tion to play games in a way that is better-suited to common
use cases in machine learning.
Definition 2 (Latent Game). Given latent space Z , latent
distribution pi on Z and mapping f : Z → A, we can define
the distribution pf ∈ P(A) as
a ∼ pf : a = f(z) , z ∼ pi . (3)
A latent game (ϕ,F ,G) is a two-player zero-sum game
where the players pick mappings f ∈ F and g ∈ G and
obtain payoffs according to
ϕ(f, g) := ϕ(pf , pg) = Ez∼pi, z′∼pi′
[
ϕ
(
f(z), g(z′)
)]
where pi and pi′ are two fixed latent distributions.
Algorithm 1 is a simple meta-algorithm to train agents in
latent games. The function oracle(f,F , ϕ˜) is a black
box oracle similar to the one described in Balduzzi et al.
(2019) that gives an improvement for the mappings f within
the class F using the approximate payoff ϕ˜. Crucially, the
equilibria of latent games depend on the function classes
F and G, which in practice are specified by the choice of
neural net architecture, see §2.2.
In games where the number of strategies grows exponen-
tially, such as Colonel Blotto (Example 2), we cannot com-
pute the Nash using standard methods for two-player zero-
sum games. We thus reformulate Colonel Blotto as a latent
game:
Example 2 (Latent Blotto). For i ∈ {1, 2}, consider the
function fi : Rp → Ai where Ai is defined in (2). Then
ϕ(f1, f2) :=
1
K
K∑
k=1
P
(
[f1(Z1)]k > [f2(Z2)]k
)
(4)
where Z1, Z2 ∼ N (0, Ip) are independent Gaussians.
Latent games are closely related to the RL policies used to
play StarCraft II (Vinyals et al., 2019). The agent, called
AlphaStar, has a latent-conditioned policy pi(a|s, z) where
z belongs to a structured space that represents information
about how to start constructing units and buildings sampled
from expert human players: z ∼ phuman(z). Given two
agents pi1(a|s, z) and pi2(a|s, z), the payoff in the latent
game is
ϕ(pi1, pi2) = P(pi1 beats pi2) .
The classes F and G correspond to the neural architecture
used to parameterize the policies; the priors pif and pig are
the human expert distribution phuman. Latent games thus
provide a useful framework for training agents on challeng-
ing games, whilst incorporating real-world constraints and
additional information encoded in highly structured priors.
2.2. Minimax Theorem for Latent Games
Classical game theory introduced mixed strategies to find
equilibria in games. Analogously, we need to define latent
mixtures of mappings.
Latent mixture of mappings. Consider latent mappings
g1 and g2 that generate probability distributions pg1 and pg2 ,
as in (3). The latent mixture pλ of g1 and g2 with λ ∈ [0, 1]
is the mixture of these two probability distributions:
pλ := λpg1 + (1− λ)pg2 .
To sample from pλ, flip a biased coin with P(heads) = λ.
If the result is heads then sample a strategy from pg1 and
if the result is tails then sample from pg2 . We used the de-
nomination latent mixture because the mixture is performed
before sampling the latent variable. We can generalize latent
mixtures to an arbitrary number of mappings and define2
∆(G) := {Latent mixtures of mappings from G}. (5)
More formally, ∆(G) is the ‘strong’ convex hull of the
distributions {pg, g ∈ G}. Thus ∆(G) is a subset of P(A),
the set of all distributions on A. This set is different from
the set of distributions supported on G considered by Arora
et al. (2017); Hsieh et al. (2019). The set ∆(G) contains
‘smaller’ mixtures because there may be many distributions
supported on G that correspond to the same p ∈ ∆(G). For
instance in Example 4, any point in the hole of the annulus
is in ∆(G) and is at most a mixture of two elements while
the set of distributions on G contains infinite mixtures.
Our first main result is a Minmax theorem for latent games:
Theorem 1. Let (ϕ,F ,G) be a latent game. We have,
max
p∈∆(F)
min
q∈∆(G)
ϕ(p, q) = min
q∈∆(G)
max
p∈∆(F)
ϕ(p, q) (6)
where ∆(G) is defined in (5). We call this value VL.
2See Appendix B for a formal definition.
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R
PG
O
r
P
Q
Figure 1. Illustration of the annular rock-paper-scissors game, Ex-
ample 4. The points P,Q, and O correspond to the projection on
the simplex ∆3 of the respective points p, q and 0. Dotted points
correspond to latent mixtures in ∆(G) that are not in PG .
Theorem 1 implies that latent games have a value and an
equilibrium, the two necessary notions to define meaningful
solutions for two-player zero-sum games.
It is crucial to notice that the space of latent mixtures ∆(G)
may not cover the whole space of mixed strategies P(A).
Thus, the latent game (ϕ,F ,G) may not have the same
equilibrium and value as (ϕ,A,B), the original zero-sum
two player game (1):
VL 6= V := min
p∈P(A)
max
q∈P(B)
ϕ(p, q) .
This difference, in terms of value and equilibrium with stan-
dard normal form games is not a drawback but a feature of
latent games. Such latent game equilibria have a meaning-
ful interpretation in terms of games played by agents with
restricted capacity which we develop in §6 and Appendix A.
The next example builds intuition about the geometry of
∆(G) and illustrates why the minimax theorem is essential.
Example 4 (Annular Rock-Paper-Scissors). Recall Rock-
Paper-Scissors from Example 1. Directly represent a mixed
strategy as a point in the probability simplex ∆3 ⊂ R3.
Introduce a latent game (ϕ,G,G) with mixed strategies ex-
pressed in the subset of the simplex (denoting 1 := [1, 1, 1]):
PG = {p ∈ ∆3 : 0 < r ≤ ‖3p− 1‖ ≤ R ≤ 1}.
The geometry of Example 4 is represented in Fig. 1. The
equilibrium for each player is the point O 6∈ PG . The payoff
ϕ can be geometrically interpreted as ϕ(p, q) = ‖OP‖ ·
‖OQ‖ · sin(∠POQ). We have that minp∈PG ϕ(p, q) =
−‖OP‖ ·R and maxu∈U ϕ(p, q) = ‖OQ‖ ·R. Thus, even
though ϕ is bilinear we have,
max
p∈PG
min
q∈PG
ϕ(p, q) = −rR < rR = min
q∈PG
max
p∈PG
ϕ(p, q) .
The Minimax theorem thus fails over G. However, the
Minimax theorem holds over latent mixtures as O ∈ ∆(G).
2.3. Exploiting Latent Games’ Structure
Recasting Example 3 as a latent game yields a latent GAN
that closely resembles the standard GAN formulation pro-
posed by Goodfellow et al. (2014), with the difference that
the second player controls a latent discriminator (instead of
a pure discriminator).
Example 3 (Latent GANs). Let G : Rp → Rd a generator
and a latent discriminator ψ : Rd × Rq → R, the payoff
ϕ(ψ,G) of the latent GAN is defined as,
E
z∼pi
x∼pdata
[ln(σ(ψ(x, z))] + E
z∼pi
z′∼pi′
[
ln
(
1− σ(ψ(G(z′), z))] ,
where pi and pi′ are latent distributions.
However, the structure of discriminators in GANs implies
that there is a “reduction” from mixed to pure discriminators:
Proposition 1. For any latent discriminator ψ there exists
a non-latent discriminator D, independent of G, such that,
ϕ(ψ,G) ≤ ϕ(D,G) , ∀G ∈ G ,
where D(·) := Ez∼piD [ψ(·, z)] is the mean of ψ over z.
The result follows from the fact that ϕ(·, G) is concave for
any G ∈ G. Note that this is not the case for the genera-
tor, i.e., for most of ψ, the payoff −ϕ(ψ, ·) is not concave
with respect to the mapping G. For such latent games with
concave payoff, we can define a new notion of latent game
where the first player does not need to use a latent mapping
(since any latent mapping is dominated by a pure strategy).
Definition 3 (Semi-latent Game). A semi-latent game
(ϕ,D,G) is a two-player zero-sum game for which
ϕ(·, g) is concave for any g ∈ G .
The first player plays “pure”-strategies D ∈ D ⊂ A and
the second plays latent mappings g ∈ G. The payoff is
ϕ(D, g) := Ez∼pi
[
ϕ
(
D, g(z)
)]
where pi is the latent distribution for g.
Notice that the set of pure strategies D is only a subset of
the whole strategy space A. For instance, as in Example 3,
when the strategy space is a function space it might not be
reasonable to assume that the discriminator can pick any
function. In practice, the first player often has access to a
set of parametrized functions. For simplicity, we assume
that, in semi-latent games, D is a space of functions.
It is the case for instance for GANs, which are arguably
the most prominent example in machine learning of a semi-
latent game: the set D corresponds to a class of discrimina-
tors and G to a class of generators (often neural networks
with a given architecture).
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Similarly to how latent games were denoted by a triplet
(ϕ,F ,G), to emphasize the importance of the limited-
capacity classes of mappings F and G, a semi latent game
is denoted (ϕ,D,G). The subtle difference is that D corre-
sponds to subset of the whole strategy space A (assumed to
be a function space) while G corresponds to a class of latent
mappings from the latent space Z to the strategy space B.
By concavity of ϕ(·, g), any mixed strategy p of element of
D is dominated by Dp := ED∼p[D], the average strategy
over the mixture. Define the strong convex hull of D as
Avg(D) := {Any average of strategies from D}. (7)
Even if latent mixtures (5) and averages (7) are both defined
using a class of mappings/functions, they significantly differ.
While (7) can be understood as a set of point-wise average
of functions, the set of latent mixtures (5) can be seen as
a set of convex combinations of probability distributions
induced by latent mappings.
In semi-latent games the first player leverages the concavity
of its payoff to only play pure strategies. Because any
mixed strategy is dominated by an element of Avg(D), the
Minimax theorem also holds for semi-latent games, only
considering averages of strategies for the first player:
Theorem 2. Let (ϕ,D,G) be a semi-latent game. The Min-
imax theorem holds when considering averages of strategies
for the first player and latent mixtures of mappings for the
second one, i.e.,
max
D∈Avg(D)
min
q∈∆(G)
ϕ(D, q) = min
q∈∆(G)
max
D∈Avg(D)
ϕ(D, q)
where ∆(G) and Avg(D) are respectively defined in (5)
and (7). We call this value VSL.
A meaningful notion of equilibrium can be defined in latent
and semi-latent games via a minimax theorem considering
an analogous (but different) notion of convex combination.
In the following, we will focus on latent game but our results
can be extended to semi-latent games.
3. Latent Games in Machine Learning
In latent games (ϕ,F ,G) the players use mappings to play
the game. In an ML context, these mappings are often
parametrized by finite dimensional variables,
F := {fw : w ∈ Rp1} and G := {gθ : θ ∈ Rp2}.
Thus, the payoff can be seen as a function of w and θ,
ϕ(w, θ) := ϕ(fw, gθ), and consequently there is an equiva-
lence between the minimax theorem in the parameter space
and that in the mapping space,
max
θ∈Rp1
min
w∈Rp2
ϕ(w, θ) = max
f∈F
min
g∈G
ϕ(f, g)
and min
w∈Rp2
max
θ∈Rp1
ϕ(w, θ) = min
g∈G
max
f∈F
ϕ(f, g) .
Even if one can design parametric non-convex-non-concave
games where pure global minimax do not exist (Jin et al.,
2019), latent games provide a framework where there is
hope to show (approximate) minimax theorems even when
the function ϕ is highly non-convex-non-concave with re-
spect to the parameters w and θ, e.g., fw and gθ correspond
to (deep) neural networks. By working in the mapping space,
we prove in §4.3 that ReLU neural networks can achieve
approximate global minimax equilibria.
Approximate minimax for latent games. A notion of an
approximate solution for (6) can be defined using -safety
sets. Such sets contain the agents that are -close to achiev-
ing the value of the game.
Definition 4 (-Latent Equilibrium). Let (ϕ,F ,G) be a
latent game. The -safety sets F∗ and G∗ are the sets of 
approximate solutions of the minimax problem,
∆(F)∗ := {p∗ ∈ ∆(F) : min
q∈∆(G)
ϕ(p∗, q) ≥ VL − }
and ∆(G)∗ := {q∗ ∈ ∆(G) : max
p∈∆(F)
ϕ(p, q∗) ≤ VL + } .
An -equilibrium is a pair (p∗ , q
∗
 ) ∈ ∆(F)∗ ×∆(G)∗ .
It can be shown that such approximate solutions of (6)
can be achieved with finite latent mixture of K map-
pings. Considering fk ∈ F that generates the distribution
pfk , 1 ≤ k ≤ K (see Eq.3), we aim at finding the smallest
mixture that is an approximate solution of the minimax (6)
KF := Smallest K ∈ N s.t.
K∑
k=1
λkpfk ∈ ∆(F)∗ .
Our goal is to provide a precise bound that depends on  and
on some properties of the classes F and G.
Theorem 3. Let (ϕ,F ,G) be a latent game. If F and G are
compact and ϕ is L-Lipschitz then,
KF ≤
4L2 diam(F)2
2
ln(N (G, 2L ))
where N (G, ) is the number of -balls necessary to cover
G. We have a similar bound for KG .
The quantity N (G, ) is called covering number of G in
the literature. When G is compact, it is a finite complexity
measure of the class G that has been extensively studied in
the context of generalization bounds (Mohri et al., 2012;
Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David, 2014).
Note that in practice we expect KD to be small. For in-
stance in the context of GANs, if the class of discriminators
contains the constant function D(·) = 0, then this function
belongs to a Nash since ϕ(D, ·) = 0 and thus KD = 1.
Roughly, the number KF expresses to what extent the set
of distributions induced by the mappings in F has to be
‘convexifed’ to achieve an approximate equilibrium.
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4. Achieving Pure-Nash with Neural Nets
We showed above that approximate equilibria in latent
games can be achieved with finite latent mixtures. In this
section, we investigate how it is possible to achieve pure-
Nash with neural networks.
Let NNp be the set of two-layer neural networks with p hid-
den neurons and ReLU non-linearities. Formally, function
g : Rd → Rdout in NNp can be written as,
g(x) =
p∑
i=1
ai ReLU(c
>
i x+ di) + bi
where ai, bi ∈ Rdout , ci ∈ Rd, di ∈ R and ReLU(x) =
max(x, 0). We present two results on the representative
power of neural networks. The first concerns mixtures of
latent mappings (5) for G = NNp and the second concerns
averages of strategies (7) for D = NNp.
4.1. Neural Nets represent mixtures of smaller Nets
When working with a latent mapping g, we are interested in
the probability distribution pg induced by g. In this section,
we consider g ∈ NNp : [0, 1] → R and the uniform prior
distribution U([0, 1]),
a ∼ pg : a = g(z) where z ∼ U([0, 1]) and g ∈ NNp .
We show that a latent mixture of two neural networks can
be represented by a single, wider neural network.
Proposition 2. Any latent mixture (5) of two latent map-
pings g1, g2 ∈ NNp, can be approximated to arbitrary
precision with a single latent mapping g3 ∈ NN2p+1. More-
over, if there exist x, x′ s.t. g1(x) = g2(x′) then the latent
mixture between g1 and g2 can be represented by a latent
mapping g3 ∈ NN2p.
The proposition naturally extends to any finite latent mix-
ture of mappings. Fig. 3b (in §E) illustrates how g3 is
constructed.
Unlike the universal approximation theorem, Prop. 2 shows
that latent mixtures can be exactly represented by a single
neural network. On the one hand, when one wants to ap-
proximate an arbitrary continuous function the number of
required hidden units may be prohibitively large (Lu et al.,
2017) as the error  vanishes. On the other hand, the size of
g3 in Prop. 2 does not depend on any vanishing quantity.
The high level insight is that mixtures of ReLU neural nets
can be represented by a larger ReLU neural network with a
width that grows linearly with the size of the mixture or the
width of the smaller ReLU networks. In §4.3 we leverage
this representation property to prove that ReLU neural nets
can achieve approximate pure equilibria in latent games.
4.2. Neural Nets represent average of smaller Nets
If we consider averages of functions as described in (7), we
can show that point-wise averages of functions f ∈ NNp :
Rd → Rdout can be represented by a wider neural network.
Proposition 3. Any point-wise average of two functions in
NNp can be represented by a single function of NN2p.
This property is illustrated in Figure 3a and extends naturally
to any finite point-wise average of functions. Similarly as
the Prop. 2, Prop. 3 is a representation theorem that we
will leverage to show that ReLU neural nets can achieve
approximate pure equilibria in semi-latent games.
4.3. Minimax Theorem for Neural Networks
Prop. 2 and 3 give interesting insights about the representa-
tive power of ReLU neural nets: as their width grows, ReLU
nets can express larger latent mixtures/averages of sub-nets.
Combining these properties with Theorem 3, we show that
approximate pure equilibria can be achieved with a single
ReLU neural net.
Theorem 4. Let (ϕ,NNp,NNp) be a latent game. For
any  > 0 there exists a pair of networks in NNp that
achieve a pure -equilibrium of a lower-capacity sub-game
(ϕ,NNp ,NNp). The capacity of the sub-game is at least
p ≥ C√p .
where C > 0 contains log-dependencies in p and .
An explicit formula for C is provided in §E. Theorem 4
shows that latent games played with a single-pair of agents
using a standard fully connected architecture can achieve
a notion of weaker-capacity-pure-equilibrium. This result
differs from Arora et al. (2017, Theorem 4.3) who, only
in the context of GANs, design a specific architecture to
achieve an approximate equilibrium.
On the one hand, if 
√
p < 1, then the bound is vacu-
ous (since p is an integer). On the other, the width only
needs to grow quadraticaly with  to achieve a non-vacuous
bound. Hence, a consequence of Theorem 4 is that highly
overparametrized networks can provably represent an ap-
proximate high-capacity-pure-equilibrium.
5. Application: Solving Differentiable Blotto
We apply our latent game approach to solve a differentiable
version of Colonel Blotto game (Example 2). We consider a
continuous relaxation of the strategy space where S1 = S2.
After renormalization we have that A1 = A2 = ∆K , where
∆K is the K-dimensional simplex. It is important to notice
that in that case a pure strategy corresponds to a point on
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(a) 5000 samples using the latent mapping f and g after 0, 400, and 800 training
steps. Their respective suboptimality along training has a value of 1.5, 1.2, and .5.
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(b) Performance and convergence of the agents.
Figure 2. Training of latent agents to play differentiable Blotto (8) with K = 3. Right: The suboptimality corresponds to the payoff of
the agent against a best response. We averaged our results over 40 random seeds, the transparent shades are the standard deviations.
the simplex and a mixture of strategies corresponds to a
distribution over the simplex. We replace the payoff (4) of
Latent Botto by a differentiable one,
ϕ(f, g) := Ez∼pi, z′∼pi′
[ 1
K
K∑
k=1
σ([f(z)− g(z′)]k)
]
(8)
where σ is a sigmoid minus 1/2 and f, g : Rp → ∆K . This
game is studied by Ferdowsi et al. (2018) when S1 > S2.
For the latent mappings, f anf g we considered dense ReLU
networks with 4 hidden layers, 16 hidden units per layer and
a K-dimensional softmax output. We use a 16-dimensional
Gaussian prior for the latent variable. We trained our agents
using Alg. 1 with the Adam optimizer (Kingma and Ba,
2015) with β1 = .5 and β2 = .99 as oracle.
In Figure 2b we plotted the performance of the agents
against a best response. To compute an approximate best
response, we sampled 5000 strategies with f and computed
the best response against this mixed strategy using gradi-
ent ascent on the simplex. We also computed the norm of
the (stochastic) gradient used to update f . In Figure 2a we
plotted samples from f at different training times. As we
get closer to convergence to a non exploitable mixture, we
can see that this distribution avoids the center of the simplex
(putting troops evenly on the battlefields) and the corners
(focusing on a single battlefield) that are strategies easily
exploitable by focusing on two battlefields, this correlates
with the decrease of the gradient and of the suboptimality
indicating that the agents learned how to play Blotto.
6. Discussion
Solution concepts like von Neumann’s minmax theorem
and Nash equilibria are fundamental to game theory be-
cause they provide meaningful targets against which perfor-
mance can be measured. Loosely, the minmax theorem pro-
vides a notion of optimal behavior in two-player zero-sum
games. However, games differ radically from optimization
problems: equilibria can require mixed strategies whereas
optima are always pure. Concretely, it is obvious that all
three pure strategies in rock-paper-scissors are brutally ex-
ploitable. How, then, can single neural nets so regularly find
meaningful solutions to zero-sum games like GANs?
In this work, we partially explain why practitioners have
successfully trained pure neural nets in games like GANs
by showing that a single pair of ReLU neural networks can
achieve an notion of limited-capacity-equilibrium.
The intuition underlying our theorems is as follows. Neu-
ral nets have a particular structure that interleaves matrix
multiplications and simple nonlinearities (often based on
the max operator like ReLUs). The matrix multiplications
in one layer of a neural net compute linear combinations
of functions encoded by the other layers. In other words,
neural nets are (non)linear mixtures of their sub-networks.
Finally, it is instructive to discuss the relative merits of the
‘true’ minimax equilibrium of game and its limited-capacity
version that occurs in latent games. On the one hand, a
Nash equilibrium always exists for two-player zero-sum
games but this quantity may not be realistically tractable,
e.g., in GANs, the optimal infinite-capacity generator is
supposed to represent the distribution of ‘real world images’.
In a similar vein, simple statements such as ‘are there two
Nashes?’ or ‘is there a Nash that contains the strategy s?’
are NP-hard problems for two-player games (Gilboa and
Zemel, 1989). If such concepts are hard to compute it seems
unrealistic to expect limited capacity agents, such as humans
or computers, to find equilibria (Papadimitriou, 2007).
On the other hand, our work shows that some latent equi-
libria can be efficiently approximated when working with
neural networks. Latent equilibria capture the notion that
agents–and humans–that play complex games have a limited
capacity. It seems more realistic to play complex games
such as Poker of StarCraft II that are multi-step with imper-
fect information. Thus, latent equilibria are a compelling
solution concept that seem more practical than infinite ca-
pacity Nash equilibria.
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APPENDIX
A. Interpretation of Equilibria in Latent
Games
In latent games, players embed in mapping spaces in order to
solve the game. When we consider a standard normal form
game ϕ that we try to solve using mappings to approximate
mixtures of strategies, we are actually playing a limited
capacity version of the game that heavily depends on the
expressivity of the mappings in the classes F and G.
Such a limitation may be interpreted as limitations on the
skills of the players. It intuitively makes sense that such
limitations would change the optimal way to play the game:
the optimal way to play StarCraft II is different for players
that can perform 10 versus 100 actions per second. Thus, if
the goal is to train agents to compete with humans, one needs
to set a class G that (roughly) corresponds to human skills.
Setting “fair” constraints on the RL agents trained to play
the game of StarCraft II has been an important issue Vinyals
et al. (2019) and can be understood as setting the right class
G in a latent game. Similarly a player would not play poker
the same way if they had no memory of their opponents’
behavior in previous games.
Similarly, in the context of Generative Adversarial Net-
works, it has been argued that setting a restricted function
class for the discriminator provides a more meaningful loss
and describes an achievable learning task for the genera-
tor Arora et al. (2017); Huang et al. (2017). The final task is
to generate pictures that are realistic according to the human
metric. Such task is way looser – and thus easier to achieve
– than for instance minimizing the KL divergence or the
Wasserstein distance between the real data distribution and
the generated distribution.
To sum-up, the equilibrium of a latent game provides a
notion of limited-capacity-equilibrium that can define a tar-
get that correspond to agents with expressive and realistic
behavior. In many tasks, our goal is to train agents that
outperform human using human realistic limitations: it is
important to constrain the agent in order to prevent it to play
105 actions per minute but it is also important to constrain its
opponent because we would like opponent to try to exploit
the main agent in a semantically meaningful way and not
by designing very specific ’adversarial example’ strategies
–e.g., very precise positions of units that breaks the vision
system of the main agent – that a human player could not
perform.
B. Latent Mixture of Mapping
Let us first recall that given a latent space Z , a distributions
pi over this latent space and a latent mapping f : Z → A
we can generate
a ∼ pf : a = f(z) , z ∼ pi . (9)
Let us denote P(A) the set of Borel measures on A.
For any setX , we can define a notion of convex combination
of elements of X using a measure µ ∈ P(X),
x¯ :=
∫
X
xdµ(x) (10)
For a given class of mappings g ∈ G, we define the set of la-
tent mixture of mappings as the set of ‘convex combination’
of the distribution belonging to {pg , g ∈ G},
∆(G) :=
{∫
G
pgdµ(g) : µ ∈ P(G)
}
Note that very importantly, this construction is different
from considering the set of distribution with support G be-
cause for any p ∈ ∆(G) there might exist many µ ∈ P(G)
such that p =
∫
G pgdµ(g).
Proposition 4. If G is compact then ∆(G) is compact.
Proof. From (Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Chap. 15) if G
is compact then the set P(G) is compact. Finally ∆(G) is
the image of P(G) by a continuous application and thus is
compact.
Similarly, if D is compact, then Avg(D) is compact.
C. Proof of results from Section 2
Proposition 1. For any latent discriminator ψ there exists
a non-latent discriminator D, independent of G, such that,
ϕ(ψ,G) ≤ ϕ(D,G) , ∀G ∈ G ,
where D(·) := Ez∼piD [ψ(·, z)] is the mean of ψ over z.
Proof. This proposition results from the concavity of
ln(σ(·)) and ln(1− σ(·)). For the proof sketch let us con-
sider a mixture pD of two feature maps such that
Eψ∼p[ψ] = ψ¯
Then, ϕ is defined is (3) has the following property
ϕ(x, p) := Eψ∼PDϕ(x, ψ) (11)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Eψ∼PD [ln(σ(ψ(xi))] (12)
+ Eψ∼PD [ln(1− σ(ψ(x))]
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
ln(σ(ψ¯(xi)) + ln(1− σ(ψ¯(x))
= ϕ(x, ψ¯) . (13)
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where the inequality comes from the concavity of ln(σ(·))
and ln(1− σ(·)).
In its general form Minimax Sion’s theorem can be formu-
lated as follows,
Theorem 5 (Minimax theorem (Sion et al., 1958)). If U
and V are convex and compact sets and if the sublevel sets
of ϕ(·, v) and −ϕ(u, ·) are convex then,
max
u∈U
min
v∈V
ϕ(u, v) = min
u∈U
max
v∈V
ϕ(u, v) (14)
This theorem combined with Proposition 4 proves Theo-
rem 1 and 2.
Proof of Theorem 1 and 2. We just need ot verify the hy-
pothesis of Theorem 5.
In the case of Theorem 1, the function ϕ is convex-concave
(actually bilinear by construction) with respect to the the dis-
tributions belonging to ∆(G) and ∆(F). By Proposition 4
these sets are compact and convex by construction.
In the case of Theorem 2, by assumption ϕ(·, g) is concave
and Avg(D) is compact and convex. The rest is similar as
in the latent case.
D. Proof of Theorems from Section 3
Let us first prove a lemma
Lemma 1. diam(∆(F)) = diam(F).
Proof. Since F ⊂ ∆(F), we have that diam(∆(F)) ≥
diam(F). Let us show the other inequality, Let us consider
f1, f2 ∈ ∆(F), then we have
‖u− v‖ = ‖
∫
F
pfdµ1(f)−
∫
F
pf ′dµ2(f
′)‖ (15)
≤
∫
F
∫
F
‖pf − pf ′‖dµ1(f)dµ2(f ′) (16)
≤
∫
F
∫
F
Ddµ1(f)dµ2(f
′) (17)
= D (18)
where D := diam(U). The first inequality comes from the
triangle inequality, the second one comes from the definition
of the diameter and the third one from Fubini and the fact
that µ1 and µ2 are probability measures.
Theorem 3. Let (ϕ,F ,G) be a latent game. If F and G are
compact and ϕ is L-Lipschitz then,
KF ≤
4L2 diam(F)2
2
ln(N (G, 2L ))
where N (G, ) is the number of -balls necessary to cover
G. We have a similar bound for KG .
Proof. This proof is inspired from the proof of (Lipton and
Young, 1994, Theorem 2) and (Arora et al., 2017, Theorem
B.3).
Since G is a compact it has a finite covering numberN (G, ).
It is the smallest number of  balls needed to cover G
(see (Mohri et al., 2012) for details about covering num-
ber in the context of machine learning).
Let us consider qi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N (G, 2L ) the center of these
balls.
Let us consider (p∗, q∗) an equilibrium of (ϕ,F ,G) (does
exists because of Theorem 1).
The mixture p∗ can be written as,
p∗ =
∫
F
pfdµ(f) . (19)
where µ ∈ P(F). Now let us consider the mixture
p∗n :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
pfk (20)
where fk, 1 ≤ k ≤ n are independently drawn from µ.
Using Hoeffding’s inequality, for any qi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N (G, )
we have that,
P(ϕ(p∗n, gi)− ϕ(p∗, gi) < /2) ≤ e
−n2
2L2D2 (21)
where D = diam(F). Thus using standard union bounds,
P
(
ϕ(p∗n, qi)− ϕ(p∗, qi) < /2 , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ .N (G, 2L )
)
≤ N (G, 2L )e
−n2
2L2D2 (22)
Let us now consider
gˆn ∈ arg min
g∈G
ϕ(p∗n, g) . (23)
Note that ming∈G ϕ(p∗n, g) = minq∈∆(G) ϕ(p
∗
n, q) since a
pure strategy always achieve that minimum. We have that
qi is an /(2L) covering there exist an index i such that
ϕ(p∗n, gi) ≤ ϕ(p∗n, gˆn) + /2 . (24)
and we know that
ϕ(p∗, q) ≥ ϕ(p∗, q∗) = VL , ∀q ∈ ∆(G) . (25)
Thus for n > 2L
2D2
2 ln(N (G, 2L )) we have,
P
(
ϕ(p∗n, q)− ϕ(p∗, q∗) < , ∀q ∈ ∆(G)
)
< 1 (26)
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(a) ReLU networks of width p can represent any p-piecewise linear
function. The point-wise average f3 of two ReLU neural networks
f1 and f2 is a piecewise linear function that can be represented by
a wider ReLU neural network.
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(b) Latent mixture of g1 and g2: For k ∈ {1, 2, 3} the transforma-
tion gk maps the uniform distribution on [0, 1] into a distribution
on the output space: x ∼ pgi iff x = gi(z) , z ∼ U([0, 1]). In
that case, pg1 and pg2 are respectively the uniform distribution
over I1 and I2. The function g3 represents a distribution that puts
half of its mass uniformly on I1 and the other half on I2.
Figure 3. Difference between pointwise averaging of function and latent mixture of mapping.
Since this probability is strictly smaller than one, among all
the possible sampled p∗n there exist at least one such that
ϕ(p∗n, q) ≥ + VL (27)
Thus,
KF ≤
4L2D2
2
ln(N (G, 2L )) . (28)
E. Proof of Theorem from Section 4
Proposition 3. Any point-wise average of two functions in
NNp can be represented by a single function of NN2p.
Proof. We will prove this result for a pointwise average of
K functions of NNp. Let us recall that a two-layers ReLU
network of width p can be written as
g(x) =
p∑
i=1
ai ReLU(c
>
i x+ di) + bi (29)
where ai, bi ∈ Rdout , ci ∈ Rd and di ∈ R. Then, let
us consider K such elements of NNp, then any convex
combination of these K function can be written as,
f(x) =
K∑
k=1
p∑
i=1
λk(ai,k ReLU(c
>
i,kx+ di,k) + bi,k) (30)
where λk ≥ 0 , 1 ≤ k ≤ K and
∑K
k=1 λk = 1.
Setting a˜i,k := λkai,k and b˜i,k := λkbi,k, we have that
f(x) =
∑
(i,k)∈[p]×[K]
a˜i,k ReLU(c
>
i,kx+ di,k) + b˜i,k (31)
which belongs to NNpK .
E.1. Proof of Proposition 2
This proposition is related to the study of ReLU neural
networks. See for instance (Hanin, 2019) and (Arora et al.,
2018)
Definition 5. A continuous real p-piecewise linear func-
tion f : [0, 1] → R is a piecewise linear function with p
pieces,i.e., there exists 0 =: x0 < x1 < . . . < xp+1 := 1
and ai, bi ∈ R such that
f(x) =
p∑
i=0
1{xi ≤ x < xi+1}(aix+ bi) . (32)
In this definition we assume that f is continuous and thus
that aixi+1 + bi = ai+1xi+1 + bi+1 , 0 ≤ i ≤ p.
Lemma 2. For all xi < xi+1 and a, b ∈ R such that
axi + b = 0, there exists ai, bi, ci, di such that
aibcix+dic+ + bi =
{
0 if x < xi
ax+ b if xi ≤ x ≤ xi+1
(33)
Proof. We set di = −xi, ci = 1, bi = b and ai = a.
Theorem 6. (Arora et al., 2018) A two-layer ReLu network
of width p is a p+1-piecewise linear function f : [0, 1]→ R.
Conversely, Any p + 1-piecewise linear function can be
written as a two-layer ReLu network of width p+ 1.
Proof. The function encoded by a two-layers ReLu network
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of width p is
g(x) =
p∑
i=1
aibcix+ dic+ + bi , (34)
where b·c+ stands for max(0, ·). A maximum of a p-
piecewise linear function and 0 is at most a p+ 1-piecewise
linear function and a sum of a p-piecewise linear function
and a q-piecewise linear function is at most p + q − 1-
piecewise linear. Thus aibcix+ dic+ + bi is a 2-piecewise
linear function and thus g(x) is a p + 1-piecewise linear
function.
Let f be a p + 1-piecewise-linear function. We have that
there exists 0 =: x0 < x1 < . . . < xp+1 := 1 such that
f(x) =
p∑
i=0
1{xi ≤ x < xi+1}(aix+ bi) . (35)
In order to prove this result we will proceed by induction.
Let us assume we have built a two-layers ReLu network of
width j such that gj =
∑j
i=1 aibcix+ dic+ + bi and,
gj(x) = f(x) , ∀x ≤ xj . (36)
Using the convention that
∑0
i=1 aibcix + dic+ + bi = 0
this result is true for j = 0.
Let us assume that this result is true for j ≥ 0. Then if
we consider the function f − gj we have that, by induction
hypothesis f(xj)− gj(xj) = 0 and by construction of gj ,
this function is linear on [xj , xj+1]. Thus,
(f − gj)(x) = ax+ b , ∀xj ≤ x < xj+1 (37)
Thus we can apply Lemma 2 to show that there exists
aj , bj , cj , dj such that,
ajbcjx+ djc+ + bj =
{
0 if x < xj
ax+ b if xj ≤ x < xj+1
(38)
Setting gj+1(x) = gj(x) + ajbcjx + djc+ + bj , we have
that,
gj+1(x) = f(x) , ∀x < xj+1 , (39)
and using the fact that ajxj+1 + bj = aj+1xj+1 + bj+1 we
have that the induction hypothesis is verified for j + 1:
gj+1(x) = f(x) , ∀x ≤ xj+1 .
Proposition 2. Any latent mixture (5) of two latent map-
pings g1, g2 ∈ NNp, can be approximated to arbitrary
precision with a single latent mapping g3 ∈ NN2p+1. More-
over, if there exist x, x′ s.t. g1(x) = g2(x′) then the latent
mixture between g1 and g2 can be represented by a latent
mapping g3 ∈ NN2p.
Proof. We will prove the first part of this theorem for an
arbitrary number K of mappings. Let g be a two-layers
ReLU network of width p, the probability distribution pig
induced by g verifies,
pig(S) = `(g
−1(S)) , ∀S measurable in [0, 1]d . (40)
where ` is the Lesbegues measure on [0, 1]d. By Theorem 6
any two-layers ReLU network of width p is p piecewise
linear and thus
g(x) =
p∑
i=0
1{xi ≤ x < xi+1}(aix+ bi) . (41)
For any measurable S ⊂ [0, 1] we have,
pig(S) = `(g
−1(S)) (42)
= `(∪pi=0{xi ≤ x < xi+1 , aix+ bi ∈ S}) (43)
=
p∑
i=0
`({xi ≤ x < xi+1 , aix+ bi ∈ S}) (44)
where the third equality is due to the fact that the intersection
of [xi, xi+1) are empty. Thus the convex combination pi of
pig1 , . . . , pigK verifies,
pi(S) :=
( K∑
k=1
λkpigk
)
(S)
=
∑
1≤i≤P
1≤k≤K
λk`({xi,k ≤ x < xi+1,k , ai,kx+ bi,k ∈ S})
Using the change of variable formula
λ`(U) =
∫
U
λd`(x) =
∫
λU
d`(x) = `(λU) . (45)
We can notice that
λ`({xi ≤ x < xi+1 , aix+ bi ∈ S}) (46)
= `({λxi ≤ x < λxi+1 , λ−1aix+ bi ∈ S}) (47)
= `({λxi + b ≤ x < λxi+1 + b , λ−1ai(x+ b) + bi ∈ S})
Then, setting ck :=
∑k−1
i=0 λk, and x˜i,k := λkxi + ck we
get by construction that
x˜i,k ≤ x˜i+1,k , 1 ≤ i ≤ p and x˜p+1,k = ck+1 = x˜0,k+1
Thus, the function f defined as
f(x) =
∑
0≤i≤P
1≤k≤K
1{x˜i,k ≤ x < x˜i+1,k}(a˜i,kx+b˜i,k) . (48)
where a˜i,k = λ−1k ai and b˜i := λ
−1
k ck + bi exactly encodes
the distribution pi. However, this function may not be con-
tinuous at x˜p+1,k−1 = x˜0,k , 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1.
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Theorem 6 only applies to continuous piecewise linear func-
tion.
In order to construct a piecewise linear function that is close
to f we set (K − 1) min(i,j)6=(k,l)(|x˜i,j − x˜k,l|) >  > 0
and we change the definition of x˜p+1,k−1 and x˜0,k for 1 ≤
k ≤ K − 1:
x˜p+1,k−1 := ck − 2(K−1) and x˜0,k := ck + 2(K−1)
(49)
We then just link the pieces of f , with
1{x˜p+1,k ≤ x < x˜0,k+1}(a˜p+1,kx+ b˜p+1,k) (50)
where a˜p+1,k =
f(x˜0,k+1)−f(x˜p+1,k)
 and b˜p+1,k =
f(x˜p+1,k)− x˜p+1,k f(x˜0,k+1)−f(x˜p+1,k) .
Let us finally define the ((p + 1)K − 1)-piecewise linear
and continuous function f˜ ,
f˜(x) := f(x)+ (51)
K−1∑
k=1
1{x˜p+1,k ≤ x < x˜0,k+1}(a˜p+1,kx+ b˜p+1,k).
Using the total variation distance between the probability
measure pi and the measure induced by f˜ we have that
TV (pi, pif˜ ) = sup
S
|pi(S)− pif˜ (S)|
≤
K−1∑
k=1
`{x˜p+1,k ≤ x < x˜0,k+1} = 
For the second part of this theorem, let us first show that any
g ∈ NNp there exists an increasing g′ ∈ NNp that represent
the same distribution. Since we have
g(x) =
p∑
i=0
1{xi ≤ x < xi+1}(aix+ bi) . (52)
Let us call Ii := [xi, xi+1] the function g maps Ii into
the interval Ji := g(Ii) = [yi, yi+1]. Since g is linear
on [xi, xi+1], the distribution induced by g is the mixture
of uniform distribution on Ji with weight xi+1 − xi. By
ordering the yi in a increasing order that we call y˜i we can
see that g represents a mixture of uniform distribution on
[y˜i, y˜i+1] (let us call λi > 0 the weights of the mixture)
Consequently, if we define x˜0 = 0, x˜i+1 = x˜i + λi, the
function that goes from y˜i to y˜i+1 between x˜i and x˜i+1
induces the same distribution as g. Formally,
g˜(x) :=
p∑
i=0
1{x˜i ≤ x < x˜i+1}(a˜ix+ b˜i) (53)
where x˜0 = 0, x˜i+1 = x˜i + λi, a˜i =
y˜i+1−y˜i
x˜i+1−x˜i and b˜i =
−x˜i y˜i+1−y˜ix˜i+1−x˜i . This function is a p-piecewise linear function
and thus can be represented by a ReLU neural network of
width p.
Let us now consider g1 and g2 two mappings such that there
exist x, x′ ∈ R such that g1(x) = g2(x). Then we have
g1([0, 1]) ∩ g2([0, 1]) 6= ∅ (54)
Since g1 induce a mixture of uniform distribution on
p-intervals (similarly as above) that form a partition of
g1([0, 1]) and g2 induce a mixture of uniform distribution
on p-intervals (similarly as above) that form a partition of
g2([0, 1]), the latent mixture of g1 and g2 induce a mix-
ture of uniform distribution on 2p-intervals (similarly as
above) that form a partition of g1([0, 1]) ∪ g2([0, 1]) that is
an interval since g1([0, 1]) ∩ g2([0, 1]) 6= ∅. By the same
construction as (53) there exists a ReLU neural network of
width p that represents the mixture of g1 and g2.
Theorem 4. Let (ϕ,NNp,NNp) be a latent game. For
any  > 0 there exists a pair of networks in NNp that
achieve a pure -equilibrium of a lower-capacity sub-game
(ϕ,NNp ,NNp). The capacity of the sub-game is at least
p ≥ C√p .
where C > 0 contains log-dependencies in p and .
Proof. Let us consider p ∈ N. Combining Theorem 3
and Proposition 2 and 3 we get that a sufficient condition
for -approximate equilibrium of (ϕ,NNp ,NNp) to be
achieved by g ∈ NNp is
p ≥ p 4L
2D2
2
ln(N (NNp , /2L) (55)
Using (Schmidt-Hieber, 2017, Lemma 5) that is,
ln(N (NNq, /2L) ≤ q ln(2Lq2/) (56)
Thus we have that if
p ≥ 4L
2D2p2 ln(2Lp
2
/)
2
(57)
then the sufficient condition holds. Finally since p ≤ p we
have that it hold for
p =
⌊

2LD
√
p
ln(2Lp2/)
⌋
(58)
Dropping the log-dependencies give us the result of the
theorem.
